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ABSTRACT—The doctrine of command responsibility posits that, when
military commanders fail to effectively prevent, suppress, or punish their
subordinates’ war crimes, the commander may be punished for the
subordinates’ crimes. Several international criminal statutes have codified
this doctrine, but the United States’ Uniform Code of Military Justice has
not. In light of U.S. law-of-war violations during the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars, several legal commentators have called for stronger legal incentives
within domestic military law and for the adoption of a formal command
responsibility provision. Such measures, it is argued, would place sufficient
pressure on senior military commanders to stem the tide of war crimes
within the U.S. military. Assuming that a formal command responsibility
statute is the best method of redress, this Note argues that a more nuanced
approach is needed to introduce the provision domestically. Namely,
Congress must shape the provision around the concerns and incentives of
small-unit leaders, not senior military commanders. As the United States
continues to engage heavily in counterinsurgency warfare, small-unit
leaders have taken on increasingly more important roles, both strategically
and with regard to preventing law-of-war violations. Accordingly, there is a
critical need for lawmakers to draft the statutory elements of a command
responsibility so as to minimize the doctrine’s costs on small-unit leaders
while maximizing these leaders’ incentives to enforce the laws of war.
Using this framework, this Note argues further that a domestic command
responsibility provision should incorporate a negligence mens rea standard
in only limited circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
In the military, commanders 1 have tremendous authority over their
subordinates. A superior may require a subordinate to conduct physical
exercises as corrective training to the point of utter exhaustion.2 In combat,
a commander may order a subordinate to assault a fortified enemy position
in the face of heavy resistance. In either situation, the subordinate often has
little choice but to accept his orders as a matter of duty. 3
The price for such authority is what many refer to as the burden of
command. 4 Commanders are expected to complete every assigned mission
while simultaneously being entrusted with their subordinates’ lives,
training, equipment, discipline, fitness, and overall well-being. 5
1

Although the term commander has a specific meaning within the U.S. military, this Note uses the
term to refer to any military leader that has direct authority over one or more soldiers. It is used
interchangeably with the terms “superior” and “leader.”
2
The concept is called “smoking.” Although highly discouraged by senior military leaders, it is a
common form of corrective training. See Lewis Wald, Corrective Training: Every Unit Commander
Should Know, Follow Three Golden Rules, FORT HOOD SENTINEL (Sept. 2, 2010),
http://www.forthoodsentinel.com/story.php?id=4723.
3
See ALFRED TENNYSON, Charge of the Light Brigade, in SELECTED POEMS 52, 52 (Stanley
Applebaum ed., Dover Publ’ns 1992) (“Theirs not to make reply, / Theirs not to reason why, / Theirs
but to do and die. / Into the valley of Death / Rode the six hundred.”).
4
See, e.g., THE LAST CASTLE (DreamWorks Pictures 2001) (using the phrase “burden of
command” in this context).
5
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP para. 2-10 (12 Oct. 2006)
[hereinafter FM 6-22].
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Furthermore, a commander’s responsibility exists regardless of whether the
subordinate is on-duty or off-duty, in the field or in the barracks, or
deployed overseas or stationed at home. 6 In short, commanders are
“responsible for all that the unit does or fails to do.”7
This maxim raises an interesting question: to what extent are
commanders criminally responsible for the illegal actions of their
subordinates? Consider the following three scenarios. First, Commander A
in Iraq is compelled to release a detainee he strongly suspects killed one of
his soldiers. He orders his lieutenant to transport the man to a nearby
village and to “take care of him” along the way. Reading between the lines,
the lieutenant executes the detainee in the desert.8 Second, a sergeant
watches one of his fellow soldiers become severely injured during an attack
in Afghanistan. Over the next week, he openly complains in front of
Commander B that the unit should retaliate for the attack. Soon after, the
sergeant slips off base in the early morning and kills several civilians.9
Third, a group of soldiers carry out a plan to kill an unarmed Afghan
teenager and make it look like an act of self-defense. Despite convincing
evidence to the contrary, Commander C accepts their version of events and
halts any further inquiry. 10 What punishment, if any, could each
commander face under the current military justice system?
Commander A’s criminal liability has long been established under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 11 Under Article 77, any military
leader that “counsels, commands, or procures” the commission of a crime
is punishable as if he committed the crime himself. 12 The provision is
similar to the notion of complicity, because it translates a commander’s
active participation in the crime into actual commission.13 Here, because
6

Id. para. 2-11.
KEITH E. BONN, ARMY OFFICER’S GUIDE 314 (50th ed. 2005).
8
This hypothetical is based loosely on an event that occurred near Baiji, Iraq in April 2008. See Joe
Mozingo, A Killing in the Desert: Two Gunshots and Many Questions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at
A1.
9
This hypothetical is based on the killings carried out by Staff Sergeant Robert Bales. See Michael
Evans, How a Bearded US Sergeant Slipped Out to Commit an Afghan Massacre, AUSTRALIAN (Mar.
13, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/how-a-bearded-us-sergeant-slippedout-to-commit-an-afghan-massacre/story-fnb64oi6-1226298022670.
10
This hypothetical is based on the Kill Team murders. See Mark Boal, The Kill Team: How U.S.
Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians and Mutilated Their Corpses, ROLLING STONE,
Apr. 14, 2011, at 56, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327.
11
The UCMJ, which is codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, sets out military law that “govern[s]
the Army as a separate community, to include the procedural and substantive rules governing the
conduct of members of the armed forces.” John M. Hackel, Planning for the “Strategic Case”: A
Proposal to Align the Handling of Marine Corps War Crimes Prosecutions with Counterinsurgency
Doctrine, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 239, 246 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
10 U.S.C. § 877 (2012).
13
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985); see also
Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates—The
7
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Commander A’s take care instruction is a tacit order to kill the detainee, he
would be liable for murder.14
Commanders B and C also face the prospect of punishment, even
though they have not actively participated in their subordinates’ crimes. In
these cases, their culpability depends on the doctrine of command
responsibility. In general, the doctrine states that commanders have a duty
to prevent, suppress, and punish their subordinates’ war crimes. 15 If they
fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures to carry out these duties,
they may be punished. 16 In B’s case, his culpability results from a failure to
prevent the enraged sergeant from killing civilians, whereas C’s culpability
stems from his failure to punish his subordinates for the staged killing.
The doctrine of command responsibility has been recognized within
the United States military since the aftermath of the Second World War.
American military jurists first applied it to belligerent military leaders
during the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials. 17 In 1956, the U.S. Army
incorporated command responsibility within its own military dogma with
the release of its manual on the law of land warfare. 18 By including
command responsibility within the manual, the U.S. Army established the
doctrine as a guiding principle for future commanders.
Despite such recognition, however, the United States has never
codified the doctrine within the UCMJ. As such, the U.S. military does not
have a criminal command responsibility statute applicable to its own
leaders. So although the doctrine serves as a touchstone for military
discipline, it does not serve a direct basis for criminal culpability.
Under the current military justice system, leaders who fail to
adequately prevent or punish violations of the law of war are disciplined
instead under the general category of command failures. Stated differently,
these failures are generally punished in the same manner as all other types
of command failures. In many instances, a commander’s failure—including
one that involves a violation of the law of war—is handled through
administrative or other nonjudicial means. 19 In more serious cases, a
commander may be charged with criminal dereliction of duty under Article
92 of the UCMJ.
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272,
279 (1997) (“The guilt of the superior-accomplice is premised on the commission of a crime by a
subordinate-principal.”).
14
See, e.g., CHANTAL MELONI, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 2
(2010).
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id.
17
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 274–76.
18
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 501 (18
July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10].
19
See Victor Hansen, Creating and Improving Legal Incentives for Law of War Compliance,
42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 247, 257 (2008).
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Although rare, a commander may face the prospect of more severe
punishment than criminal dereliction of duty. In at least one instance in
U.S. history, military prosecutors applied Article 77 against a commander
who failed to prevent his subordinates from committing a mass atrocity.20
Consequently, there is also precedent to invoke the UCMJ’s complicity
provision when prosecuting command responsibility failures under the
current military justice system.
Despite the flexibility it offers in punishing leaders who fail to prevent
or appropriately punish subordinate war crimes, this legal framework has
received scant support from legal scholars. Many believe these tools fail to
create an effective system for enforcing the law of war within the
military. 21 Drawing on their concerns, two military lawyers have sought to
codify the doctrine within the UCMJ.22 By drafting a provision that mirrors
the international standard of command responsibility, they argue, the U.S.
military will be better able to prevent the next My Lai, Abu Ghraib, or
Haditha. 23
Assuming that military leaders need more accountability over their
subordinates’ law-of-war violations, and adopting a command
responsibility provision is the best method for achieving this result, 24 the
proposals offered by these two practitioners would fail to create an
effective preventative regime within the United States. In line with the
20
See Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7 (1972)
(discussing United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)); Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and
Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 192–
200 (2000) (same).
21
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248; Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command
Responsibility: From Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 638, 639 (2007);
William C. Peters, Adjudication Deferred: Command Responsibility for War Crimes and US Military
Justice from My Lai to Haditha and Beyond, 37 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 926, 927 (2009); Amy J.
Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 251, 258–60 (2009).
22
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 266–70; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19.
23
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19. For more information on
the My Lai incident, see infra Part II.B.2. The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal occurred in 2003 and
involved U.S. intelligence soldiers physically, psychologically, and sexually abusing Iraqi prisoners.
See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB
(2004) (discussing both the torture occurring at Abu Ghraib and the resulting scandal). The Haditha
incident occurred in 2005 and involved a Marine unit killing at least twenty-four civilian
noncombatants. Initially, the Marine Corps claimed the civilians had been accidently killed in a
roadside bombing and failed to investigate the incident. See Peters, supra note 21, at 940.
24
Some scholars argue that procedural changes to the current military justice system are a better
avenue for addressing command responsibility issues than substantive alterations. See Jason Sengheiser,
Command Responsibility for Omissions and Detainee Abuse in the “War on Terror,” 30 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV. 693, 719 (2008) (calling for independent prosecutors to handle command responsibility cases);
James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the
Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 701–08 (2006) (proposing procedure changes to
court martial system). Another alternative solution is simply to improve training standards throughout
the military regarding the laws of war, especially among junior leaders. See infra note 236.
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prevailing opinion on command responsibility, these proposals seek to hold
leaders at the highest levels of authority responsible for law-of-war
violations. 25 To accomplish this feat, a statute must establish a low bar for
liability (i.e., a low standard for mens rea and causation) because it is often
difficult to connect senior leaders to a war crime. 26 This low threshold,
however, yields an unintended secondary effect: it establishes a near-strict
liability regime for small-unit commanders 27 who have a closer connection
with subordinate-offenders. The consequences of this effect are significant.
As the U.S. has shifted toward a counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare model,
small-unit leaders have taken on increasingly more complex and
strategically vital roles. In current military operations, they are often
entrusted with broad authority to operate in their own battle spaces and are
crucial to mission success and preventing law-of-war abuses. 28
Given the importance of small-unit commanders, there is a need to
reevaluate how command responsibility should be adopted within the
UCMJ. If Congress is to draft a formal criminal provision, it must do so in
a manner that gives greater weight to the concerns of small-unit leaders.
Essentially, the legislature should formulate the statutory elements of a
command responsibility statute by considering their costs and benefits on
junior military leaders.
Relying on this new framework, this Note will address one of the more
difficult questions of command responsibility: whether the doctrine should
encompass a negligence standard.29 Current proposals for formally
adopting command responsibility within the U.S. generally embrace a

25

Legal scholars exploring the issue of command responsibility often seek to assign responsibility
to senior military leaders. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,
93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 156–59 (2005) (focusing on senior leadership in Abu Ghraib); Victor Hansen,
What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander—Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United
States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 397–
400 (2007); Martinez, supra note 21, at 639 (finding that “generals and presidents [often] bear a greater
share of moral responsibility” in command responsibility cases); MELONI, supra note 14, at 27–31
(discussing the need to establish responsibility for top leaders); Sengheiser, supra note 24, at 697 (“For
the doctrine of command responsibility to reduce violations of the laws of war, it must seek to assign
responsibility up the chain of command.”); Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 276–79 (focusing on
prosecution of high-ranking commanders in Haditha incident).
26
See Martinez, supra note 21, at 639 (stating that “hard proof of the connection between the
generals and the crimes committed by their foot soldiers is often extremely difficult to find”); Wu &
Kang, supra note 13, at 272 (“The further away a superior is from the actual ‘smoking gun,’ however,
the more difficult he is to prosecute.”).
27
The term “small-unit commander” refers to military leaders who serve in tactical (i.e., groundlevel) leadership positions. Namely, it encompasses sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.
28
See MARK MOYAR, A QUESTION OF COMMAND: COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO IRAQ 236–37 (2009) (illustrating broad scope of one small-unit leader’s authority during COIN
operations in Iraq).
29
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 285–86.
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negligence requirement.30 When considering the effects of this standard on
small-unit leaders, however, it becomes apparent that negligence should
only be used in limited circumstances.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I explores a brief history of
command responsibility, reveals the doctrine’s core elements, and
identifies its most controversial components. To best illustrate the current
state of command responsibility within the United States, Part II draws on
two recent law-of-war violations committed by American soldiers: the Kill
Team incidents and the Staff Sergeant Robert Bales massacre. These
incidents help illustrate the methods for punishing command failures under
the current military justice system. Part III then discusses the criticism of
this system and introduces two proposals for codifying command
responsibility within the UCMJ. After outlining these schemes, Part IV
identifies their shortcomings and addresses the need for a small-unit
commander approach by considering the central tenets of COIN warfare.
Having shown the necessity for a small-unit leader approach, Part V
analyzes the effectiveness of maintaining a negligence standard within
command responsibility.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Although command responsibility dates back to the early fifteenth
century, 31 it is best understood in the context of its modern history. The
current doctrine is essentially the product of developments made in the law
of armed conflict in the 1940s. 32 Toward the end of the Second World War,
the United States and its allies sought to hold several high-ranking German
and Japanese officers accountable for a number of atrocities committed by
their soldiers. In many of these cases, though, there was little direct
evidence that these leaders ordered or actively participated in the abuses.33
Consequently, the Allies needed an indirect theory of liability—one that
criminalizes leaders for failing to exercise their power of control.34
Stated simply, command responsibility posits that, under certain
circumstances, a commander may be criminally culpable for a war crime
committed within his ranks. 35 This responsibility stems from a breach of
two related duties. In general, a commander has a duty to maintain
discipline and order within his unit. As part of this duty, he has the
30
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 269; Smidt, supra note 20, at 169. But see Sengheiser, supra note
24, at 698 (proposing a recklessness standard).
31
See MELONI, supra note 14, at 3 (“A significant forerunner of the doctrine . . . was contained in
the Ordinance issued in 1439 by Charles VII d’Orleans . . . .”).
32
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 274.
33
Id.
34
Id. (claiming there was a need “for a legal doctrine through which superiors could be held liable
for the same substantive crimes as their subordinates”).
35
See, e.g., MELONI, supra note 14, at 3.
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obligation to prevent his subordinates from violating the laws of war. 36 If
the commander fails in these duties, his omission translates into criminal
culpability.
The theory does not hold leaders strictly liable. 37 Commanders are not
held responsible simply because they assumed a position of command. 38
Instead, they must be connected to the war crime in two ways. First, there
must be a causal relationship between the commander’s omission and the
misconduct. Second, “the commander must have had the opportunity and
ability to prevent the crime.” 39 In other words, he must have the power to
stop it.
The United States laid much of the groundwork for the doctrine during
the trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. 40 Yamashita was the Japanese
commander of the Philippines during the U.S. invasion of the islands in the
spring of 1945. After several months of hard fighting, the American
advance started to gain momentum and forced the Japanese to fall back. In
the midst of their retreat, Japanese soldiers executed thousands of Filipino
citizens and American prisoners of war. 41 After the islands fell, the U.S.
subsequently charged Yamashita with “unlawfully disregard[ing] and
fail[ing] to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of
the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes . . . .” 42
Despite a lack of evidence that Yamashita had personally ordered
these acts or even knew about them, he was convicted under a command
responsibility theory by a military commission.43 Yamashita claimed that
because the United States had effectively cut his lines of communication, it
was impossible for him to know what was happening, or, even if he had
known, he could not have ordered his soldiers to stop. 44 The commission
believed, however, that the crimes were so “extensive and widespread, both
as to time and area, that they must either have been willfully permitted by

36
Id. (stating that a superior’s criminality consists of his “failure to exercise control properly over
his subordinates and to take the necessary measures for the purpose of preventing their crimes or
punishing them”).
37
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 281 (stating that strict liability “is an inapposite analogy to
command responsibility”).
38
See Smidt, supra note 20, at 182–83 (discussing the German High Command Case).
39
William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard,
97 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982).
40
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 274–75. To be sure, there are a number of important cases
during this era that helped lay the groundwork for command responsibility, including the German High
Command Case and the Hostage Cases. The trial of Yamashita, though, is the most famous. Id. at 274.
41
Id.
42
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 275.
44
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 53–54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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[Yamashita], or secretly ordered by” him. 45 In convicting Yamashita, the
commission set two important precedents. First, it confirmed a
commander’s legal duty to control his subordinates and prevent abuses.46
Second, it established two elements of culpability: a commander must have
“some degree of knowledge” about the crimes and the opportunity to
prevent them. 47 In doing so, it carved out mens rea and actus reus elements.
Although Yamashita helped lay the groundwork for command
responsibility, the doctrine suffered from two major issues in the postwar
era. First, Yamashita (along with other war crimes trials) left several
questions unanswered. Namely, it failed to define the extent of a
commander’s duty, what steps a commander must take to fulfill his duty,
the appropriate level of mens rea, and the role of causation.48 Furthermore,
the doctrine lacked widespread acceptance immediately following the war.
Several jurists complained that the doctrine was simply an exercise of
“victor’s justice.” 49
In an effort to address these concerns, the international community has
codified command responsibility in several accords over the past fifty
years. The doctrine appears in Protocol I to the Geneva Convention
(Protocol I), 50 the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), 51 and the Rome Statute of
45
Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 275 (citing 4 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 34 (1948)).
46
Smidt, supra note 20, at 180–81.
47
Id. at 181. Smidt points out that there are several interpretations of what level of mens rea was
used to convict Yamashita. One possibility is that he had actual knowledge of the crimes and secretly
ordered them. Another is that he must have known of the crimes and did not stop them. Id.
48
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 295 (discussing scope of commander’s duty); id. at 295–97
(discussing limits on feasibility); id. at 278–79 (discussing mens rea); id. at 288–90 (discussing
causation).
49
Arthur T. O’Reilly, Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign the Doctrine with Principles of
Individual Accountability and Retributive Justice, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 127, 128 (2005); see also
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 29–30 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (suggesting Yamashita’s prosecution was an
“impulse[] of vengeance and retaliation”).
50
Protocol I, Article 86, titled “Failure to Act,” states:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and
take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol
which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate
does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 42–43
[hereinafter Protocol I].
51
The ICTY and ICTR provisions are substantively identical:
The fact that any of the acts referred to [in the respective articles of each Statute] was committed
by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason
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the International Criminal Court. 52 These documents reaffirm the core
elements of command responsibility from Yamashita and attempt to answer
the doctrine’s open-ended questions. Together, they demonstrate marked
progress in the development of command responsibility. Differences
among the individual provisions, though, illustrate that some uncertainties
in the doctrine remain.
In the past five decades, the international community has settled on the
first two unanswered questions from Yamashita: the breadth of a
commander’s duty and how to measure his efforts. At first, commanders
were simply required to “repress grave breaches” of the laws of war. 53 This
meant that they were only culpable for failing to prevent ongoing crimes or
crimes that were about to occur. The most current articulations of the
doctrine, however, state that a commander also has the duty to “punish the
perpetrators” of a crime. 54 Thus, commanders must act when they discover
a crime ex post facto. Similarly, international law has firmly established the
requisite level of effort required by a commander to fulfill his duty. He
must take all “necessary and reasonable measures” to either prevent or
punish the commission of a crime. 55 The provision is adaptable to the
circumstances of each case and seeks to determine whether the commander
had the “effective ability” to take prophylactic measures. 56
Despite the agreement on the above issues, there is little consensus on
the remaining two questions from Yamashita: the requisite level of mens
rea and the appropriate role of causation in command responsibility. 57 With
to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.
Compare Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
1877, art. 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], with Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 1901, art. 6(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1901 (Dec. 16,
2009) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
52
Article 28 of the Rome Statute establishes:
(a) A military commander . . . shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 19
[hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf.
53
Protocol I, supra note 50.
54
ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51.
55
Rome Statute, supra note 52; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51.
56
MELONI, supra note 14, at 171–72.
57
See Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 18–20; Hansen, supra note 25, at 403.
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respect to mens rea, most agree that requiring a commander to have actual
knowledge of a crime is unproductive. 58 Thus, each international statute
and treaty establishes a mens rea requirement below knowledge. 59 None of
these provisions, however, agrees on a single standard. 60 Commentators
disagree as to what constitutes an appropriate mens rea regime as well.61
Similarly, the role of causation remains unsettled. On one hand, Protocol I
and the Rome Statute require that a subordinate’s crime be the result of his
commander’s omission. 62 On the other, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes omit a
causation analysis altogether.63 Jurists and scholars have yet to propose a
widely accepted formulation as well.64
The struggle to define the latter two elements of command
responsibility revolves around the tension between the doctrine’s principle
aim—deterrence—and notions of fundamental fairness. 65 Amidst the fog of
war, military leaders “bear the brunt of preventing” violations of the law of
war. 66 They are tasked with instilling discipline among their subordinates
and controlling those subordinates’ use of force. Under the threat of
criminal punishment, these commanders are encouraged to provide “the
maximum degree of control and vigilance” over their soldiers.67 In this
sense, leaders become the instrument that international law uses to prevent

58
See, e.g., Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 20 (stating that a knowledge standard is an invitation to
“see and hear no evil” (quoting Roger S. Clark, Medina: An Essay on the Principles of Criminal
Liability for Homicide, 5 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 59, 78 (1973))).
59
See Protocol I, supra note 50; ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51; Rome
Statute, supra note 52.
60
See Protocol I, supra note 50 (listing mens rea standard as “if they knew, or had information that
should have enabled them to conclude”); ICTY Statute, supra note 51 (listing mens rea standard as
“knew or had reason to know”); Rome Statute, supra note 52 (listing mens rea standard as “knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known”). Complicating the matter further, few
jurists agree on the exact meaning of each phrase. See Hansen, supra note 25, at 405 (“It is not unusual
for tribunals to place different meanings on the same terms.”).
61
Compare Hansen, supra note 19, at 269 (advocating for a Model Penal Code-based formulation),
with Smidt, supra note 20, at 217 (advocating for an ICC formulation).
62
Protocol I, supra note 50; Rome Statute, supra note 52.
63
ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51; see also MELONI, supra note 14, at
127 (stating that it is unclear from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals whether a causal
relationship is required).
64
See MELONI, supra note 14, at 173–74. Several proposed causation standards include: an
increased-risk approach, actual and proximate causation, and an encouragement test. See id. at 177
(describing the ICC’s implementation of an increased-risk approach); Hansen, supra note 19, at 272
(advocating a proximate cause analysis); Sengheiser, supra note 24, at 719–20 (advocating an
encouragement test); Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing
a “natural and probable consequence” standard).
65
See O’Reilly, supra note 49, at 151–52 (stating that in the context of international crimes the
“United Nations is focused on the objectives of deterrence and just punishment”).
66
Hackel, supra note 11, at 266.
67
MELONI, supra note 14, at 31.
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future crimes. 68 However, “fairness in determining criminal
accountability . . . require[s] some personal involvement on the part of the
commander.” 69 Taken to the extreme, a prevention-based justification for
command responsibility could easily translate into strict liability70—a
notion that has been rejected from the outset.71 The shifting landscape of
command responsibility results from swings between the counterweights of
deterrence and fairness.
Despite this tension, the international community seems to have settled
on the following: Commanders have a legal duty to prevent, suppress, and
punish any law-of-war violations within their chain of command. 72 They
must take all necessary and reasonable measures to fulfill these duties. 73 A
commander is culpable if he has knowledge of a crime 74 and if his breach
of duty proves to be a catalyst for his subordinate’s actions. 75 At the very
least, these tenets form the core of the modern doctrine.
II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
Although command responsibility holds a prominent place within
international law, it is less pervasive under domestic military law. The
doctrine has been incorporated within U.S. military dogma since 1956 76 but
has not been codified within the UCMJ. Command responsibility thus
serves as a guiding principle for military discipline, but not as a direct
criminal tool for military prosecutors. The U.S. military instead scrutinizes
command responsibility-type issues under the same lens as all other types
of leadership failures. As such, commanders who fail to prevent or punish
war crimes are typically disciplined using a traditional framework of
administrative and criminal provisions, as opposed to a distinct command
responsibility provision. 77

68

Id.
Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 18.
70
See Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455,
480–81 (2001) (discussing how even a negligence standard can “begin to shade into liability without
culpability”).
71
See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
72
See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
73
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
74
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
75
See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
76
See FM 27-10, supra note 18, paras. 178–79. The doctrine’s tenets have been reaffirmed recently
upon the release of the U.S. military’s COIN manual. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24,
COUNTERINSURGENCY app. para. D-24 (15 Dec. 2006) [hereinafter FM 3-24].
77
See infra Part II.B.
69
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A. Murder in Kandahar
To better understand how the U.S. military currently punishes
leadership failures and how such failures could be punished under a
substantive command responsibility provision, it is first helpful to draw on
two recent incidents. One is the 5th Stryker Brigade Kill Team murders that
occurred near Kandahar, Afghanistan in early 2010. The other is the Staff
Sergeant Bales civilian massacre that took place near the same area in
March 2012. Both offer valuable insight into the current military justice
system and the most principled approach for implementing command
responsibility domestically.
1. The Afghan Kill Team.—In March 2011, a reporter from Rolling
Stone magazine revealed how several soldiers in a platoon planned,
executed, and covered up the murder of at least three innocent Afghan
civilians. 78 The soldiers, who were members of 3rd Platoon, Bravo
Company, 2-1 Infantry, 5th Stryker Brigade, first deployed to Afghanistan
in July 2009. Throughout their first several months of operating near
Kandahar, the platoon sustained several casualties, but had little
opportunity to identify and engage the enemy directly. 79 After a popular
squad leader 80 was wounded, Staff Sergeant Calvin Gibbs was transferred
to the platoon to take over this role. Shortly after his arrival, Gibbs
concocted a plan to turn morale around. After weeks of discussion, he
convinced several members of his squad to start staging attacks in order to
justify killing Afghan “savages.” 81
The first staged killing occurred in January 2010 in the isolated
farming village of La Mohammad Kalay. While their platoon leader, First
Lieutenant Roman Ligsay, and another officer were conducting a village
meeting, Gibbs and two of his subordinates identified a teenage boy on the
village outskirts as a target. One Kill Team82 member tossed a grenade at
the boy’s feet, waited until it exploded, and then joined another member in
shooting the boy. The two claimed that a lone Taliban fighter attempted to
ambush the unit in broad daylight with a single grenade—“an unlikely
story.” 83 Shortly after the attack, a village elder approached the patrol’s

78

See generally Boal, supra note 10.
Id. at 58, 64.
80
A squad leader is a small-unit commander who is typically in charge of four to ten soldiers and
holds the rank of Staff Sergeant. See Operational Unit Diagrams, U.S. ARMY, http://www.army.mil/
info/organization/unitsandcommands/oud/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
81
See Boal, supra note 10, at 58; see also Craig Whitlock, Soldier Says Afghans’ Killings Were
Plotted by Staff Sergeant, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A14, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/27/AR2010092705753.htm.
82
Mark Boal used the moniker “Kill Team” in his article exposing the murders. Boal, supra note
10, at 56. There is no evidence that the soldiers in Gibbs’s squad referred to themselves as such.
83
Id. at 58.
79
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leaders, claiming that the boy was murdered.84 However, these leaders
ignored both the elder and the questionable circumstances. Within a few
days of the killing, the teenager’s uncle, along with several other villagers,
“descended on the gates of [the unit’s base] . . . to demand an
investigation.” 85 The soldiers involved were re-interviewed, but the
battalion’s investigating officer believed there were “no inconsistencies in
their story.” 86
Gibbs staged another attack in the village of Kari Kheyl a month later.
Prior to the mission, he had scrounged up a series of drop weapons 87 to
bolster his cover stories. For this killing, he had found a functioning AK-47
rifle. During the mission, while the rest of the platoon was legitimately
engaged with other village members, Gibbs identified his target. He fired
the AK-47 into a nearby wall, threw it at the victim’s feet, and shot the man
with the help of two other subordinates. 88 Gibbs later reported the victim
shot first, but then had his rifle jam. A fellow squad leader, Staff Sergeant
Sprague, inspected the AK-47 shortly thereafter and believed it be in
perfect working condition. Later in the day, Sprague actually used the
weapon after receiving fire and claimed it worked “with no problems at
all.” 89 After identifying this discrepancy, he reported it to Lieutenant
Ligsay; however, the platoon leader did not look into the matter further.90
Eventually Army investigators stumbled onto the killings after looking
into a separate incident. In the course of their investigation, other members
of the platoon reported that the Kill Team’s illegal exploits were common
knowledge. In fact, the platoon had built a reputation for “staging killings
and getting away with it.” 91 Moreover, a few others indicated that they were
well aware of the Kill Team’s ambitions prior to the first incident in
January.
Several months later, the Army launched a separate investigation into
the question of officer accountability within 5th Stryker Brigade. The
report found a system-wide breakdown of discipline. Officers generally did
not communicate properly with their subordinates and showed contempt for
84

Id.
Id. at 60.
86
Id.
87
During combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army maintains records of all
ammunition, magazines, and explosives assigned and expended by units. A ‘drop weapon’ is generally
a former enemy weapon or explosive, not listed in any records, which can be dropped at the scene,
whenever a unit’s actions may have violated the rules of engagement. See American News Project, US
Troops Discuss “Drop-Weapons,” YOUTUBE (June 2, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
SODTI_C1q_Q. Staff Sergeant Gibbs had found his ‘drop’ AK-47 while on a previous mission. Boal,
supra note 10, at 66.
88
Boal, supra note 10, at 67.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 60.
85
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normal Army rules. 92 Furthermore, several soldiers were caught smoking
hashish in their Stryker vehicles, while others circulated photos of
themselves standing over dead bodies, the latter of which is a law-of-war
violation itself. 93 The report also placed part of the blame directly on
Colonel Harry Tunnell, the brigade commander. 94 It claimed that his
“inattentiveness to administrative matters . . . may have helped create an
environment in which misconduct could occur.” 95 It also questioned
whether his open contempt for the Army’s COIN doctrine and outspoken
support for “ruthlessly hunt[ing] down the Taliban” 96 may have influenced
the behavior of the Kill Team. 97
In the aftermath of the killings, the U.S. military summarily punished
the soldiers directly involved in the crime. Staff Sergeant Gibbs was tried
for murder and received a sentence of life in prison as the leader of the Kill
Team. 98 Most of the remaining Kill Team members pled guilty to murder or
other charges and received lesser sentences—the maximum being twentyfour years. 99
2. The Staff Sergeant Bales Massacre.—The Kill Team murders
occurred over a series of months, whereas the Staff Sergeant Bales atrocity
occurred in a single night. In the early morning hours of March 11, 2012,
92
Soldiers were often found unshaven, conducted patrols with their sleeves rolled up, and called
officers by their first names—all of which are basic infractions of Army policy. See Karin Assmann et
al., ‘Let’s Kill’: Report Reveals Discipline Breakdown in Kill Team Brigade, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE
(Apr. 4, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/let-s-kill-report-reveals-disciplinebreakdown-in-kill-team-brigade-a-754952.html.
93
See id.; see also Boal, supra note 10, at 60, 65.
94
A brigade commander is a senior officer that is typically in charge of 3000–5000 soldiers and
holds the rank of colonel. See Operational Unit Diagrams, supra note 80.
95
Assmann, supra note 92 (alteration in original).
96
Id.
97
See Craig Whitlock, Brigade’s Strategy: ‘Strike and Destroy,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2010, at
A1.
98
Nick Allen, Leader of US Army ‘Kill Team’ Guilty of Afghan Murders, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 12, 2011, 12:33 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8885631/
Leader-of-US-army-kill-team-guilty-of-Afghan-murders.html.
99
Adam Ashton, On Appeal, Army Court Reduces One of Three “Kill Team” Murder Convictions,
THE NEWS TRIBUNE (May 31, 2014), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/05/31/3221157/on-appealarmy-court-reduces-one.html (outlining Private First Class Holmes’s plea deal and seven-year
sentence); Matthew Cole, ‘Kill Team’ Soldier Gets Three Years in Prison, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/kill-team-soldier-years-prison/story?id=14239130 (describing Specialist
Winfield’s plea deal and three-year prison sentence); Court Sentences ‘Kill Team’ Soldier to 24 Years
in Prison, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
murder-in-afghanistan-court-sentences-kill-team-soldier-to-24-years-in-prison-a-752918.html (noting
Specialist Morlock pled guilty to multiple counts of murder (among other charges) and received twentyfour years in prison). Military prosecutors, however, dropped all charges against Specialist Wagnon,
whom the Army initially suspected of being the fifth Kill Team member. See Army Drops Murder
Charge Against Last Soldier Tied to ‘Kill Team’ Cases, STARS AND STRIPES (Feb. 4, 2012), http://
www.stripes.com/army-drops-murder-charge-against-last-soldier-tied-to-kill-team-cases-1.167726.
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Staff Sergeant Bales unexpectedly departed from Camp Belambay, a small
U.S. outpost located near Kandahar. 100 After walking past an Afghan guard,
Bales traveled down the road to a nearby village. 101 Once there, he
proceeded to break into several homes and execute sixteen men, women,
and children. 102 Sometime during the night, an Afghan guard notified the
chain of command that a U.S. soldier left the base carrying his weapon. 103
The outpost commander then ordered a headcount and realized that Bales
was missing. Just after the commander dispatched a patrol to search for
him, Bales returned by himself. Finding Bales covered in blood, several
U.S. soldiers promptly detained him. 104
Earlier in the evening, Bales visited and drank with other members of
his platoon. At one point, they discussed how a colleague had lost his leg in
an attack the week prior. Later in the evening, he spoke with a senior
noncommissioned officer about being disappointed that the unit had not
retaliated for the attack. 105 Leading up to the killings, Bales also began to
frequently lash out at junior soldiers.106 Moreover, almost the entire day
before the crime, he vented his anger by “chopping and sawing a large tree
that the soldiers had taken down near the base.” 107 The unit’s leadership,
however, did not identify Bales as a potential law-of-war threat. In the end,
Staff Sergeant Bales admitted to the killings, pled guilty, and received a
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.108
B. The Prospects of Punishing Command Failures
Although the punishment meted out to the Kill Team members and
Staff Sergeant Bales was widely publicized, there is little information on
whether their commanders received any discipline. It is likely that the
commanders received little, if any, punishment for failing to prevent their

100

Evans, supra note 9.
Id.
102
Kirk Johnson, Pretrial Hearing Starts for Soldier Accused of Murdering 16 Afghan Civilians,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012, at A16.
103
See Evans, supra note 9.
104
See Associated Press, Highlights of Testimony in Preliminary Trial of Staff Sgt. Robert Bales,
OREGONIAN (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:43 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/
2012/11/highlights_of_testimony_in_pre.html.
105
Id.
106
Gene Johnson, Staff Sgt. Bales Apologizes for Afghan Massacre, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2013,
5:22 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/22/afghanistan-massacre-bales/2688
995/.
107
Id.
108
Associated Press, Staff Sgt. Robert Bales Sentenced to Life in Prison Without Chance of Parole
for Afghanistan Massacre that Left 16 Dead, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:35 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/army-staff-sgt-robert-bales-life-chance-parole-article1.1435117.
101
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subordinates’ war crimes. 109 Regardless of this outcome, there are a number
of punitive measures the U.S. military could have applied to the Kill Team
and Staff Sergeant Bales’ commanders. Such options include: applying
administrative sanctions, 110 implementing nonjudicial punishment, 111 or
charging the commanders with criminal dereliction of duty. 112 These
measures are available whenever a commander commits any type of
serious leadership failure.
There is also a fourth, seldom-used option that could have been
applied (likely for the Kill Team murders only): charging a commander as
an accomplice to the crime using Article 77 of the UCMJ. Military
prosecutors have applied this approach at least once in American history in
an effort to introduce command responsibility through the military
judiciary. 113 Part II.B outlines these current U.S. mechanisms and, using
Lieutenant Ligsay as an example, demonstrates how they may be applied to
commanders who fail to take appropriate action with respect to their
subordinates’ war crimes.
1. Noncriminal Punishment.—Army Regulation 27-10, the directive
that governs military justice, permits senior leaders to employ a wide range
of administrative measures to enforce discipline.114 Common methods
include: issuing a letter of reprimand, giving a subordinate leader a
negative evaluation report, or removing a subordinate commander from his
position of authority. 115
Issuing a letter of reprimand is one of the more common approaches to
addressing command failures. 116 The letter is an official document that
outlines how the recipient failed to comply with military standards. In
Lieutenant Ligsay’s case, his letter would likely outline (among other
things) how he failed to investigate the questionable circumstances
surrounding Gibbs’s staged killings or report these disparities to his
superiors. At the discretion of his commander, this letter can either be filed
in Lieutenant Ligsay’s official record, which would likely cause serious

109
There are no public reports indicating that any of the officers in the Kill Team or Staff Sergeant
Bales’ chain of command were punished in connection with the war crimes committed.
110
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 257.
111
See Smith, supra note 24, at 685–86.
112
See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012).
113
See Howard, supra note 20 (discussing United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)); Smidt,
supra note 20, at 192–200 (same).
114
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE paras. 3-3 to -4 (3 Oct. 2011)
[hereinafter AR 27-10].
115
Id.
116
For example, this was the approach taken toward two senior commanders involved with the
Abu Ghraib scandal. Hansen, supra note 19, at 257 & n.43.
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damage to his career, or his local file, which would result in relatively little
damage. 117
In addition to writing letters of reprimand, a senior commander can
also issue a negative evaluation report of his derelict subordinate 118 or
relieve him of command. 119 Both of these measures are aimed at hurting the
subordinate commander’s advancement prospects. 120 They are especially
damaging when used against more senior or career-minded military
leaders.
Nonjudicial punishment, authorized under Article 15 of the UCMJ, is
a much more forceful tool than administrative action.121 In brief, it consists
of referring a formal charge against a soldier or officer who has failed to
maintain proper discipline or carry out his duty. Procedurally, a senior
commander acts as both judge and jury, weighing the evidence of liability
and considering any mitigating factors with respect to punishment. 122 For
example, if Lieutenant Ligsay were found guilty of permitting his soldiers
to collect and retain drop weapons, his senior commander would be
authorized to impose the following measures: reduction in rank,
deprivation of pay, deprivation of liberty, or some combination thereof. 123
However, despite the few similarities between these proceedings and
criminal trials, Article 15 punishment does not amount to criminal
liability. 124
2. Criminal Punishment.—In addressing leadership failures, a senior
commander could also initiate a criminal proceeding—i.e., trial by court
martial. 125 One route into the court martial system is for the senior
commander to refer his subordinate leader for a dereliction of duty charge
under Article 92. A more unorthodox approach, however, is also available
if a senior commander believes his junior leader’s failure is particularly
egregious. He can charge the junior leader directly with the underlying lawof-war violation using Article 77. In other words, Lieutenant Ligsay could
have been charged with murder in connection with the Kill Team’s three
homicides.
117
118

See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-37, UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION para. 3-4 (19 Dec. 1986).
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 623-3, EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM para. 3-4 (5 June

2012).
119

See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 2-17 (18 March 2008).
Cf. Hansen, supra note 19, at 257–58 (describing how informal sanctions ended the career of a
senior commander involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal).
121
See AR 27-10, supra note 114, at ch. 3.
122
See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. V, ¶ 4 (2012) [hereinafter MCM].
123
Id. at pt. V, ¶ 5. The appropriate authority could impose a reduction of rank by one level,
forfeiture of a total of one month’s pay, impose after-hours duty assignments for up to forty-five or
sixty days, or some combination thereof. Id.
124
Id. at pt. V, ¶ 1b (“Nonjudicial punishment is a disciplinary measure more serious than the
administrative corrective measures . . . but less serious than trial by court-martial.”).
125
For an overview of the court martial process, see Smith, supra note 24, at 686–93.
120
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a. Article 92: dereliction of duty.—The first type of criminal
charge that may be leveled at a commander who fails to prevent or punish a
law-of-war violation is dereliction of duty. Under Article 92, any soldier
who “is derelict in the performance of his duties[] shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct.” 126 If Lieutenant Ligsay’s failure to prevent the
Kill Team murders qualifies as dereliction, he is thus subject to the
provision’s criminal penalties.
Despite Article 92’s vague language, three elements are needed to
establish Lieutenant Ligsay’s criminality. First, a military prosecutor must
prove that Lieutenant Ligsay had a duty to prevent, suppress, or punish
law-of-war violations committed by his subordinates. 127 Although the
UCMJ does not specifically establish these duties, they could flow from the
Fourth Hague Convention. According to the Manual for Courts-Martial
(MCM), 128 a soldier’s duty may be defined by “treaty, statute, regulation,
lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service.”129
Under the Hague Convention, a commander has “the legal obligation to
control the conduct of his forces such that they can achieve military
objectives without . . . committing unnecessary suffering . . . to noncombatants.” 130 As such, a commander’s overall duty to control may
encompass the specific duties to prevent, suppress, and punish a
subordinate’s war crimes under the MCM standard. 131 Even if the courtmartial does not find a duty from the Hague Convention, Lieutenant Ligsay
at least had a specific duty to report any suspected war crimes occurring
within his unit.132 His duty to report would have stemmed from the rules of
engagement operating in Afghanistan at the time. 133
A prosecutor must establish next that Lieutenant Ligsay had “[a]ctual
knowledge . . . [or] reasonably should have known” about his duty to
prevent or report law-of-war violations. 134 Although this language indicates
126

10 U.S.C. § 892(3) (2012).
Hansen, supra note 25, at 394.
128
“The MCM is an executive order that details the rules for administering military justice. For
example, it sets forth the rules of evidence for courts-martial and contains a list of maximum
punishments for each offense.” U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH.,
COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK 7 (2013).
129
MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16c(3)(a).
130
Hansen, supra note 19, at 254 (citing Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631).
131
Cf. id. at 254–55 (“Even though the elements and explanations [of dereliction of duty] do not
explicitly mention the special legal duties imposed on a commander for the conduct of his subordinates,
[the MCM’s definition of duty] is certainly broad enough to include a commander’s duties and
responsibilities over his forces.”).
132
According to the Army’s standard rules of engagement, all soldiers have a duty to “report any
suspected violations of the Law of War committed by any US . . . force.” See, e.g., MND-N ROE Card
(Jan. 1, 2009) (on file with author).
133
See id.
134
MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16c(3)(b).
127
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a mens rea standard of negligence, there is some precedent suggesting
commanders must have actually known about these duties in order to
impose criminal liability. 135 Regardless of the standard, it would be difficult
for Lieutenant Ligsay to argue he did not have such knowledge. This is
especially true regarding his duty to report, because all soldiers are required
to know their rules of engagement. 136
Lastly, a commander must actually be derelict with respect to his
duty. 137 To be derelict, Lieutenant Ligsay must have willfully or negligently
failed to perform his duties or performed them in a culpably negligent
manner. 138 This would be an issue for a military jury to decide. Assuming
arguendo that he is guilty, however, the maximum punishment for
negligent dereliction is three months confinement in a military prison. 139
b. Article 77: principals.—Alternatively, it would have been
possible for Lieutenant Ligsay’s senior commander to initiate a murder
charge against him as a principal to the staged killings using Article 77. At
first glance, the approach seems counterintuitive in this case, because the
statute’s language is directed at leaders who actively participate in their
subordinates’ crimes. 140 Article 77 identifies as a principal any commander
who affirmatively “aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures” the
commission of a crime. 141 Lieutenant Ligsay did not have any such direct
involvement in the murders. However, the court-martial in United States v.
Medina—the most prominent command responsibility case in American
history—adopted the approach of using Article 77 to charge commanders
with their subordinate’s war crime when there is only passive complicity. 142
United States v. Medina was a byproduct of the infamous My Lai
massacre during the Vietnam War. In brief, Captain Medina’s company
conducted an assault on the village of My Lai. 143 Although he expected
heavy resistance, his lead unit initially reported little to no enemy
presence. 144 Soon thereafter, the same unit opened fire on unarmed
villagers, killing hundreds. 145 In the meantime, Captain Medina, who was
135

Hansen, supra note 19, at 255–56 (citing United States v. Ferguson, 40 M.J. 823, 833–34
(N.M.C.M.R. 1994)).
136
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-21.13, THE SOLDIER’S GUIDE para. 1-79 (2 Feb.
2004) [hereinafter FM 7-21.13].
137
Hansen, supra note 25, at 394.
138
MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16c(3)(c); see also Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 21.
139
MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16e(3)(A). The maximum punishment for willful dereliction
is six months. Id. at pt. IV, ¶ 16e(3)(B).
140
Smidt, supra note 20, at 195.
141
10 U.S.C. § 877 (2012).
142
See Howard, supra note 20 (discussing United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)); Smidt,
supra note 20, at 192–200 (same).
143
Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 12.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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controlling the battlefield from only 150 meters away, did not radio his
platoon to stop shooting until nearly three hours after the assault began.146
He later admitted that “he had no reason to believe My Lai was contested
by the enemy and that he had lost control of his company.” 147
The prosecution convinced the court that Article 77 applied in this
case based on a discussion section accompanying the provision in the
MCM. 148 The discussion section indicated that a commander could be liable
for failing to suppress a war crime under certain conditions.149 Namely, the
commander’s failure to act must have actually encouraged the subordinate
and the commander must have intended his failure to act as
encouragement. 150 Relying on this theory, the judge gave the following jury
instruction at trial:
[A] commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge that troops or
other persons subject to his control are in the process of committing or are
about to commit a war crime and he wrongfully fails to take the necessary and
reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war. 151

These instructions show that there is room within the UCMJ to convict
commanders who fail to suppress the commission of a war crime. As
Captain Medina’s acquittal later demonstrated, however, the standard is
exacting. Prosecutors must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a
commander has actual knowledge of the crime and that his failure served as
encouragement. 152 Therefore, even though senior military leaders likely
chose not to punish Lieutenant Ligsay for his command failures, they had
several punitive measures available should they have decided to punish
him.

146

Id. at 14.
Id.
148
See Smidt, supra note 20, at 196–98 (quoting MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 1b(2)(b) to
¶ 1b(3)). The relevant discussion indicates that a narrow affirmative duty exists when certain persons
witness a crime, including commanders.
149
Id. at 197. The combination of the discussion section and a customary duty to control
subordinates is what creates this duty. Id.
150
Id. at 198.
151
Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 15 (quoting Instructions to the Court Members, Appellate Exhibit
XCIII, at 18, United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)). The trial judge, in a later article discussing
this standard, explained further:
[I]f the commander gains actual knowledge and does nothing, then he may become a principal in
the eyes of the law in that by his inaction he manifests an aiding and encouraging support to his
troops, thereby indicating that he joins in their activity and wishes the end product to come about.
Smidt, supra note 20, at 198 (alteration in original) (quoting Howard, supra note 20, at 22).
152
See Sengheiser, supra note 24, at 715–16 (“Medina was acquitted on the basis of his lack of
actual knowledge of the atrocities.”). In a general court-martial, the accused is “presumed to be
innocent until [his] guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt.”
MCM, supra note 122, R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(A).
147
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III. CHALLENGES TO THE CURRENT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CLIMATE
Despite the breadth of punitive measures available for punishing
leadership failures, the current military justice system has received scant
support from legal scholars interested in the doctrine of command
responsibility. 153 They contend that the system either lacks adequate
punitive measures to compel law-of-war compliance among commanders
or hinders the military’s ability to carry out its mission. 154 Amplifying these
criticisms, two military lawyers have advocated for the adoption of a
command responsibility provision within the UCMJ that resembles the
international version of the doctrine.155 By codifying command
responsibility, they assert, the U.S. military will be better able to prevent
the next major law-of-war violation. Accordingly, Part III will first discuss
the criticisms of the current military justice system and then introduce two
proposals for adopting a command responsibility statute in the United
States.
A. Critiques of the Current System
Legal scholars studying command responsibility offer two principal
critiques of the American approach. The first critique faults the UCMJ for
not offering sufficient incentives to ensure leaders take their law-of-war
responsibilities seriously. 156 The severity of punishment associated with
administrative blowback, nonjudicial action, or a dereliction of duty charge
“does not adequately inform military commanders that law-of-war
compliance is a matter for their direct and constant attention.”157
Considering the “complex, confusing, and dangerous environment” of war,
the threat of a reprimand, reduction in rank, loss in pay, or even a sixmonth prison sentence seems like an inappropriate means of persuading
commanders to diligently root out war crimes. 158 Critics could further argue

153

See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–54 (focusing on Abu Ghraib scandal); Peters, supra
note 21, at 939–43 (discussing the Haditha incident).
154
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 266 (finding that after reviewing the punitive Articles, “the
unmistakable conclusion is that the incentives under the UCMJ are inadequate”); Peters, supra note 21,
at 942 (“The way ahead for US military justice and the vexing problem of command responsibility
remains open. Acknowledging serious deficiencies in the current process is only the first step.”);
Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that under the current
system, U.S. war crimes “often initially go unreported, and almost always go unpunished”); see also
William C. Westmoreland & George S. Prugh, Judges in Command: The Judicialized Uniform Code of
Military Justice in Combat, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (1980) (arguing generally that the UCMJ is
inadequate to perform its function in times of war).
155
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19.
156
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 258; see also Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 21–22.
157
Hansen, supra note 19, at 258.
158
See Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 21; Hansen, supra note 19, at 256; see also Sepinwall, supra
note 21, at 258–59 (discussing how Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman received a “mere wrist slap”
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that the threat of a murder charge against a commander using Article 77 is
hollow as well because of the difficulty associated with the “actual
knowledge” requirement. 159
The second principal critique of the current U.S. approach to
command responsibility is that it degrades the military’s image and ability
to function effectively. The disparity between the U.S. and international
approaches to command responsibility reinforces the notion that the United
States is not serious about the law of war. 160 It also weakens the legitimacy
of U.S.-led military campaigns overseas, making long-term operations
more difficult to sustain. 161 Furthermore, the legal regime helps create the
perception that only lower ranking soldiers are held accountable for their
criminal conduct. 162 This inequality of accountability erodes support for
military operations at home and affects discipline in the field, as lower
level soldiers may grow distrustful of their superiors.163
B. Codifying Command Responsibility
Two military law practitioners go beyond identifying flaws in the
American command responsibility structure to argue that the most effective
response is to codify the doctrine within the UCMJ. 164 They claim that the
doctrine’s international formulations would serve as an appropriate model
to do so. 165 Both proposals therefore draw extensively on the principles and
language of the ad hoc Tribunal and Rome Statutes and seek to implement
a more rigid standard on commanders. Although these proposals
demonstrate marked progress in the discussion on command responsibility
within the United States, they ultimately fall short of establishing a
workable standard for American military forces.

for covering up incident in his battalion where a subordinate leader threw several Iraqis off a bridge,
killing at least one).
159
Medina’s acquittal demonstrates the difficultly of this standard.
160
Cf. Smidt, supra note 20, at 156, 215–16.
161
Id. at 156.
162
See Hansen, supra note 25, at 398; see also Smith, supra 24, at 674–75 (discussing disparity of
punishment between soldiers and commanders in Abu Gharib affair); cf. Elizabeth L. Hillman,
Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and “Conduct Unbecoming,” 26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 (2008)
(“[T]he perception that high-ranking officers are rarely disciplined and almost never criminally
prosecuted is so common partly because it is true.”).
163
See Hansen, supra note 25, at 398.
164
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19.
165
As an initial matter, the customary and treaty-based international law outlined in Part I has not
been directly incorporated into U.S. military law. The United States has yet to ratify the Rome Statute.
See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statue of the International
Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 984 (2008). Furthermore, customary international
law may not be incorporated within federal law without the approval of the Senate. See Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that international treaties are not self-executing).
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1. Incorporating the ICC into Article 77.—In a review of the
command responsibility doctrine prior to 9/11, Michael Smidt offers a
simple solution to the problems associated with command responsibility in
the United States: incorporate Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute wholesale
into the UCMJ. 166 He proposes adopting the language of the Rome Statute
almost verbatim and placing command responsibility within the confines of
Article 77. Smidt’s provision states:
(3) [I]n the case of a military commander or a person effectively acting as a
military commander, while on a military operation outside the territory of the
United States, however the operation is characterized, where forces under his
or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the
case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise proper control over
such forces, where[:]
(i) That military commander or person either knew or owing to the
circumstances a[t] the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit a crime under this chapter; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission; is a principal. 167

Although Smidt does not resolve some of the ambiguous language within
the ICC, he does insist that the proposal embraces a negligence standard for
mens rea. 168
2. Adjusting Article 92: A New Dereliction of Duty.—After
examining the fallout of the Abu Ghraib scandal, Victor Hansen also
identifies a need to adopt command responsibility into the UCMJ.169 He
proposes punishing these types of command failures as derelictions of duty
rather than treating the commander as a principal to the crime. 170 Hansen’s
proposed provision would apply to any military leader exercising command
authority over a subordinate and would be triggered when the subordinate
has committed or is about to commit a war crime specified in the War
Crimes Act of 1996. 171 To satisfy the mens rea requirement under Hansen’s
proposal, a prosecutor may show that the commander had knowledge of, or
was reckless or negligent with respect to his knowledge of, the war
crimes. 172 Once a commander knows about the crime, or at least should
have known, he has a duty to prevent, suppress, or punish the crime using
“all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power.” 173
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
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Id. at 217.
See id. at 217–18.
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58.
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Id. at 267–68.
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Id. (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 28(a)(ii)).
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Moreover, the commander’s failure must be a “proximate cause” of the
subordinate’s crime. 174
The most novel aspect of Hansen’s scheme is his method of
determining punishment. For Hansen, punishment should vary according to
the level of mens rea and type of failure. If a commander knows about a
war crime and fails to prevent it, he faces the possibility of capital
punishment. If his failure was reckless or negligent, he could receive a
maximum sentence of life in prison or a twenty-year prison term,
respectively. If a commander fails to punish a war crime he knows has
occurred, his maximum punishment is a two-year prison sentence. Reckless
failures to punish incur a sentence of one year, whereas grossly negligent
failures warrant a six-month sentence. 175 Overall, Hansen believes this
scheme will effectively balance a commander’s freedom to maneuver while
creating legal incentives to make law-of-war compliance a top priority. 176
IV. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE, AND
SMALL-UNIT COMMANDERS
Assuming the scholarly critiques of the current U.S. military justice
system are valid and adopting a substantive command responsibility
provision within the UCMJ is needed, 177 both the Hansen and Smidt
proposals still fall short of providing a workable standard. Both plans fail to
adequately consider their effects on small-unit leaders. Modern warfare has
shifted increasingly toward a COIN model since the Vietnam War.178 In this
model, small-unit commanders have taken on more complex and important
roles. They are often entrusted with broad authority to operate in their own
battle spaces and are the keys to both successful COIN operations and
preventing law-of-war abuses in their areas. 179
Prevailing scholarly opinion of command responsibility, however,
focuses mainly on the need to apply punitive measures against senior
military leaders.180 As a result, most command responsibility provisions,
including the Hansen and Smidt proposals, are designed to reach the
passive failures of high-ranking commanders. 181 This means that when
these provisions address the more controversial aspects of command
responsibility (i.e., causation and mens rea), they generally embrace a low
threshold for liability. Otherwise, a senior commander may escape the
174

Id. at 272 app.
Id. at 272–73 app.
176
Id. at 270.
177
See supra note 24.
178
See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 160–67 (discussing U.S’s COIN approach during Vietnam War).
179
See id. at 236; Hackel, supra note 11, at 266.
180
See sources cited supra note 25.
181
See supra notes 50–52. The ad hoc and Rome Statutes all establish low thresholds for command
liability.
175
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reach of the statute altogether because it is often hard to link him with the
actual commission of a war crime. 182
This low threshold creates serious problems for small-unit
commanders. For these leaders, who have a much closer connection to a
subordinate-offender, the proposed standards function as a near-strict
liability regime. Given the importance of small-unit commanders in COIN
operations, this implication highlights the need to readdress command
responsibility in a more nuanced manner if it is to be adopted within the
UCMJ. A more principled approach would be to draft a provision that
focuses on the cost and benefits of liability for small-unit commanders.
This approach is imperative if the U.S. military continues to engage
predominantly in COIN conflicts in the future.
A. The Influence of COIN Operations on Command Responsibility
The increased role of small-unit commanders, both operationally and
with respect to the laws of war, is generally the result of a shift in modern
warfare toward COIN operations. Although the U.S. military did not
formally adopt a COIN approach until the middle of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, it has studied and applied COIN tactics since the
Vietnam War. 183 In contrast to traditional warfare, COIN requires soldiers
to concentrate on more than just engaging the enemy. Soldiers must
become nation builders as well as security forces. 184 In addition to seeking
out insurgents, they must be equally prepared to help reestablish local
councils and police forces, rebuild infrastructure, and provide humanitarian
relief. 185
A counterinsurgent’s main goal is to establish legitimacy for the local
government and the rule of law. 186 Conversely, insurgents seek to mobilize
support for their cause by using various techniques such as persuasion,
coercion, reaction to abuses, and foreign support.187 In light of this conflict,
COIN is often described as a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the local
populace. 188 “Put in the context of Iraq, the insurgency consists of those
enemy forces seeking to . . . convince the Iraqi public not to support the

182
See Martinez, supra note 21, at 369 (stating that “hard proof of the connection between the
generals and the crimes committed by their foot soldiers is often extremely difficult to find”); Wu &
Kang, supra note 13, at 272 (“The further away a superior is from the actual ‘smoking gun,’ however,
the more difficult he is to prosecute.”).
183
See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 160–67 (discussing the U.S. military’s COIN approach during the
Vietnam War). The United States officially embraced COIN as a method of warfare in 2006 when it
was adopted into military doctrine. See generally FM 3-24, supra note 76.
184
David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos, Foreword to FM 3-24, supra note 76.
185
Id.
186
See id.
187
FM 3-24, supra note 76, paras. 1-41 to -46.
188
MOYAR, supra note 28, at 2.
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transition to democracy . . . .” 189 In response, the U.S. strategy has become
one of “clear-hold-build.” 190 In short, units must first establish security in
an area, build a long-term foothold of support within the population, and
then work with local leaders to build governmental capacity. 191
The result of this strategy is that COIN operations are highly
decentralized. 192 Because success depends on a thorough understanding of
local history, customs, and politics, resources and responsibility are pushed
to the lowest level on the ground. 193 Company- and platoon-sized 194
elements control their own battle spaces and often build small combat
outposts near important population centers.195 As one battalion commander
put it: “I delegate authority [to subordinate commanders] until I feel
uncomfortable, and then I know I’ve got it about right.” 196 Consequently,
small-unit commanders effectively fight hundreds of smaller COIN wars
while senior commanders coordinate these conflicts and provide guidance
and direction. 197
Because these small-unit commanders operate with much less direct
supervision than they did in traditional warfare, law-of-war compliance has
become even more of a ground-level campaign. The degree of
independence, responsibility, and authority that these commanders enjoy
necessitates a focus by scholars on their legal incentives. Small-unit
commanders have always been the greatest line of defense in this area;198
however, the current modus operandi of military operations makes their
role even more essential. Small-unit commanders bear the greatest burden
in preventing war crimes, in addition to rebuilding communities and
engaging insurgents. The command responsibility doctrine should thus
reflect this reality in a manner that permits these commanders to lead
without an unreasonable fear of criminal liability for their subordinates’
actions and simultaneously drives them to prioritize compliance with the
laws of war.

189

Hackel, supra note 11, at 263–64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
FM 3-24, supra note 76, paras. 5-50 to -54.
191
Id. paras. 5-51 to -80.
192
Id. paras. 1-145 to -146.
193
Id.
194
A company is a military unit that consists of 100 to 200 soldiers, whereas a platoon is a unit
comprised of up to forty soldiers. See Operational Unit Diagrams, supra note 80.
195
See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 236 (describing how Marines in Iraq established “a galaxy of
small outposts in the district’s towns and along its roads, which they used as living quarters and bases
for combined patrolling”).
196
Kalev I Sepp, From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: The Fall and Rise of US
Counterinsurgency Capability in Iraq, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 217, 226 (2007).
197
See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 5–6.
198
See Hackel, supra note 11, at 266.
190
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B. Carving Out Room for Small-Unit Commanders
Although the COIN doctrine gives special consideration to small-unit
commanders, the doctrine of command responsibility does not. The
doctrine typically applies to any serviceman “who is entitled to give orders
to soldiers that it is the latter’s duty to obey.” 199 Consequently, command
responsibility applies to every leader in the military, from team leaders and
platoon leaders to company commanders and commanding generals.200
Needless to say, a commanding general is liable under the doctrine if he
satisfies the same criminal elements as a team leader. So in theory, smallunit and senior commanders are equal in the eyes command responsibility.
The doctrine provides the same incentives for all military leaders to ensure
their subordinates comply with the laws of war. 201
In reality, command responsibility does not affect all military
commanders equally. Instead, the doctrine applies much more forcefully to
small-unit commanders than their senior counterparts. Consider the case of
Lieutenant Ligsay and his brigade commander, Colonel Tunnell. Imagine
that Congress had adopted a command responsibility provision that
incorporated a mens rea requirement of recklessness prior to the Kill Team
murders. 202 This provision would not have applied to Lieutenant Ligsay and
Colonel Tunnell with equal measure. As a platoon leader, Lieutenant
Ligsay interacted with the subordinate-offenders on a continuous basis
during his deployment. On the other hand, as a brigade commander,
Colonel Tunnell was quite removed from the same enlisted soldiers who
carried out the murders. It would be far easier to establish that Lieutenant
Ligsay consciously disregarded any warning signs about the staged killings
than Colonel Tunnell did. 203 Therefore, Lieutenant Ligsay’s incentives and
potential for liability would be increased much more dramatically, while
Colonel Tunnell would likely be indifferent to the change.
The same disparate impact occurs when conducting a causation
analysis. Colonel Tunnell’s distance from the “smoking gun” serves as a
substantial obstacle for establishing a causal link between him and the
violation of the law of war. 204 The distance between Lieutenant Ligsay and
the same “smoking gun,” however, is significantly closer and serves as a
much smaller hurdle. Considering the difficultly in establishing command
199

MELONI, supra note 14, at 155.
In the Army, Team Leaders are typically junior sergeants in charge of four soldiers. Platoon
leaders are generally lieutenants in charge of forty to sixty soldiers. Company commanders are usually
captains with authority over 100–200 soldiers. A commanding two-star general is typically in charge of
10,000–18,000 soldiers. See Operational Unit Diagrams, supra note 80.
201
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 267.
202
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
203
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 273 (“The further away a superior is from the actual
‘smoking gun,’ however, the more difficult he is to prosecute.”).
204
See id.
200
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responsibility for senior leaders, currently enacted provisions effectively
establish a low threshold for liability. 205 A more rigorous standard may
otherwise remove senior commanders from the operational scope of the
doctrine.
Any attempt to bring senior commanders within the reach of the
doctrine through low liability thresholds has deleterious consequences for
small-unit commanders. As illustrated above, adopting a recklessness mens
rea requirement increases the prospect of liability for junior commanders
considerably. Lowering this bar further, both as to mens rea and causation,
would come dangerously close to creating a strict liability regime for smallunit commanders. 206 At the very least, it would create the appearance of a
no-fault standard that gives small-unit leaders little room for error with
respect to law-of-war violations.
This result is problematic for two main reasons. First, establishing a
near-strict liability standard violates notions of fundamental fairness. 207
Small-unit commanders may be convicted of murder or manslaughter with
little to no connection to the crime. The Staff Sergeant Bales atrocity
illustrates this point well. Bales’s superiors would arguably meet some of
the international formulations of command responsibility even though there
is a tenuous connection between their conduct and the crime. Their
culpability would dangle simply on a failure to address Bales’s posttraumatic stress following the loss of a comrade and a single retributive
statement made hours before the murders.208 In the aftermath of the
incident, however, no one has argued that these superiors are culpable.
Second, the ICC system would severely hinder a small-unit
commander’s ability to focus on his mission. These leaders are tasked with
rebuilding communities and engaging an elusive enemy, in addition to
maintaining the fitness of their soldiers, weapons, and equipment.209 As
such, there is constant competition for a commander’s time and attention.
Although commanders may need stronger incentives to prioritize law-ofwar compliance in this competition, it must not become a debilitating
concern. 210 There is already a sense of unease among small-unit
commanders that investigations or worse, criminal liability, will follow
every command failure. 211
205
This means in practice that command responsibility provisions generally include a standard of
negligence and either an increased-risk or no causation requirement, in addition to an actus reus of
omission. See supra notes 50–52.
206
See Damaska, supra note 70, at 480–81.
207
See Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 18.
208
See supra Part II.A.2.
209
See supra Part IV.A.
210
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 266 (“It is important that the doctrine . . . strike a fair balance
between imposing criminal liability and denying the commander the necessary freedom to act . . . .”).
211
Hackel describes a similar phenomenon among enlisted Marines who served in Iraq. It was
common for any soldier or Marine who had engaged in a firefight to have undergone an investigation
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Amplifying this apprehension with near-strict liability for law-of-war
violations may prove too much. Junior leaders may ultimately decide that
they are “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.” Instead of
increasing their efforts to prevent war crimes, these leaders may instead opt
out of the system altogether; the provision will likely hinder the recruitment
and retention of small-unit commanders. Regrettably, the military struggled
to retain talented junior leaders as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars carried
on. 212 Considering the vital role they play in COIN operations, the costs of
near-strict liability could prove overwhelming and degrade the military’s
overall effectiveness. So, although there is some benefit to a seniorcommander-focused statute (reaching all commanders), the marginal costs
are likely too high to make it worthwhile.
If a command responsibility provision is to be incorporated within the
UCMJ, a more principled approach is to draft a provision that focuses on
the costs and benefits of each criminal element on small-unit commanders.
To be sure, this does not necessarily translate into an across-the-board
increase in the standards of liability. 213 It simply calls for the doctrine to be
evaluated in light of its effects on small-unit commanders.
There are two likely criticisms of a small-unit leader approach. The
first is that it assumes most U.S. law-of-war violations occur because “bad
apples” commit abuses on their own. At least one scholar argues that war
crimes often occur instead as a result of improper command pressure.214
Thus, if the doctrine of command responsibility fails to reach the senior
commanders at the pinnacle of these abuses, it becomes a blunted

following the incident. Such investigations became a constant source of tension and frustration.
Specifically, Hackel notes that it had “a big impact on your average [Marine] out there. He’s reading
what’s going on in the news; he’s listening to the media. He doesn’t want to be the guy investigated for
the next shooting. A lot of the witnesses . . . in all of these cases, all of them say at times [that] if they
go back, they are a lot more reluctant to pull the trigger on anything.” Hackel, supra note 11, at 262
(alteration in original) (quoting Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel K. Scott Woodard, Senior
Def. Counsel, Camp Lejeune, N.C., in Charlottesville, Va. (Jan. 13, 2008)). Similarly, small-unit
commanders are often weary from being investigated for their command decisions, whether they relate
to keeping track of equipment, personnel matters, or decisions in combat.
212
See generally CASEY WARDYNSKI ET AL., TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS STRATEGY
FOR SUCCESS: RETAINING TALENT (2010), available at http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/
display.cfm?pubID=965 (addressing the problem of low retention rates for talented junior officers). See
also David Barno, Op-Ed., Military Brain Drain, FOREIGN POLICY, Feb. 13, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/13/military_brain_drain?page=full (discussing flight of
talented junior leaders). At the height of the war in Iraq, the Army resorted to offering select captains a
retention bonus of up to $20,000 in return for additional years of service—an unprecedented offer in
U.S. Army history. See Jim Tice, O-3s Could Soon Get $20,000 Retention Bonus, ARMY TIMES, Apr.
30, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/04/army_officer_bonus_070420w.
213
Indeed, in some cases, a low threshold of culpability is still justifiable under a small-unit leader
approach. See infra Part V.B.
214
Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 252–54.
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preventative tool.215 Examples of such improper pressure include the Abu
Ghraib scandal and the delayed investigation into the Haditha incident.216
Even if this argument proves correct, however, a small-unit leader based
statute would still appropriately address these types of scenarios. In the
context of Abu Ghraib, the cost of creating a low bar for liability would not
outweigh the benefits for small-unit commanders. Here, the need to ensure
that small-unit leaders employ proper interrogation techniques is great. 217
On the other hand, these military intelligence commanders are operating
within a setting they control—a guarded prison. This differs substantially
from the leaders who are conducting continuous engagements among the
local population. With respect to detainee operations then, a small-unit
commander approach would accommodate a broad scope of liability.
Furthermore, as outlined below, the same result occurs in the context of
delayed investigations and potential cover-ups. Strong incentives are
needed here as well to force all commanders (including junior leaders) to
report war crimes to their superiors and punish them accordingly in COIN
environments. 218
The second criticism is that a small-unit commander focus will further
the impression that senior commanders only suffer “mere wrist slaps” for
their failures. 219 Among legal scholars, there is a general perception that the
“big fish” generally avoid punishment, while the “small fries” are routinely
prosecuted for their crimes. 220 This notion runs counter to the idea that
senior commanders are supposed to be the standard bearers for the rest of
the military. The appearance of invincibility signals that law-of-war
compliance is only a secondary concern.
Although the argument carries some weight, it is little reason to shy
away from a small-unit leader approach. The issue is simply a tradeoff
between a negative image and an effective enforcement regime. Even if
senior commanders signal that law-of-war compliance is of little
importance, an approach focused on small-unit commanders would still
combat this impression among junior leaders. Moreover, a small-unit leader
provision could still increase pressure on senior commanders to make lawof-war compliance a top priority. For instance, if a junior leader were
forced to stand trial for his command failures, the actions of his superiors
would likely be brought to light as well.221 If a senior commander wishes to
215

Cf. id. at 257 (discussing how ICTY prosecutors tend to use the doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise to convict high-level defendants instead of command responsibility).
216
For background regarding the Abu Ghraib and Haditha incidents, see supra note 23. Both
incidents can be seen as “systemic harms.” Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 253.
217
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–54.
218
See infra Part V.B.
219
Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 258.
220
Id. at 256; see also supra note 25.
221
This point is illustrated in the case of the Kill Team murders. There, senior Army leadership not
only conducted an investigation into the staged killings, but also conducted a brigade-wide review of
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avoid a public criticism and rebuke, his conduct must be above reproach.
Therefore, if Congress were to incorporate a command responsibility
regime within the UCMJ, the legislature should focus on the potential costs
and benefits to small-unit commanders.
V. APPLYING THE SMALL-UNIT COMMANDER THESIS: NEGLIGENCE
If Congress were to adopt a command responsibility statute focused on
small-unit leaders, it would have to decide the controversial question of
whether commanders should be punished for their negligent failures to
prevent, suppress, or punish war crimes. 222 Many formulations of the
command responsibility doctrine embrace some form of negligence,
including the ICC statute and Hansen’s proposal. 223 Using the small-unit
leader framework as a guide, however, it becomes clear that negligence
should only retain a limited role.
A negligent command failure encompasses two ideas. It may mean
that a commander knows of an imminent crime, but negligently fails to take
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the act.224 It may
also refer to a commander who is unaware a crime is imminent (or is
occurring), but whose ignorance is a direct result of negligence. 225 Although
both forms of liability are important, the latter is the real subject of debate.
Many commentators argue that punishing commanders who should have
known about law-of-war violations constitutes the core of the doctrine. 226
The ICC and Hansen are also in agreement on this point. Under the
Rome Statute, liability is assessed against a military commander who
“either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known
that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.” 227
Similarly, under Hansen’s Model Penal Code formulation, “[a] military
commander acts negligently . . . when he should be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that forces under his effective command and control
will commit, are committing, or have committed such war crimes.” 228
As illustrated above, establishing command responsibility on this basis
comes dangerously close to establishing strict liability for small-unit

leadership and discipline. See Assmann, supra note 92. Although this report remains classified, the
information within has a better chance of being released to the public if a command responsibility trial
were initiated.
222
See Hansen, supra note 25, at 403 (identifying mens rea as “the thorniest issue” of command
responsibility).
223
See Rome Statute, supra note 52; Hansen, supra note 19, at 269.
224
MELONI, supra note 14, at 200.
225
Id. at 202.
226
Id. at 201–02; see also O’Reilly, supra note 49, at 142–43.
227
Rome Statute, supra note 52 (emphasis added).
228
Hansen, supra note 19, at 273 (emphasis added).
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commanders. 229 These penalties would draw a commander’s attention
toward law-of-war compliance, but the question is whether they reach too
far. 230 When considering the effects of a negligence standard upon smallunit commanders, the answer is mixed. In the context of failures to prevent
war crimes, a negligence regime proves unproductive. Conversely, when
dealing with negligent failures to punish (or report) a war crime, it becomes
more constructive.
A. Negligent Failures to Prevent War Crimes
When prosecuting a commander for failing to prevent a war crime, it is
not necessary that the commander should have been aware of the details of
the specific crime. 231 If this were the case, the doctrine would be stripped of
its potency and would apply only to commanders with actual knowledge.232
A commander would have to actually witness the crime unfold or have a
detailed report of the scheme.
Modern formulations of the doctrine instead require that a commander
be aware of the risk that some war crime will occur within his ranks. 233
Using Staff Sergeant Bales’s superior as an example, his liability would
depend upon how likely it was for Bales to seek retribution against the
local civilian population. If the risk was substantial and unjustifiable,234 or
if the circumstances indicated a potential risk, 235 then the superior is
punishable. In order to avoid liability in this situation, a commander must
continuously assess whether or not his soldiers are in danger of committing
war crimes. This means practically that leaders must understand what
constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute or War Crimes Act of 1996
and evaluate the risk of each occurring within his ranks. In short, then,
adopting a negligence standard transforms law-of-war compliance into an
exercise in risk assessment.
1.

Transforming Law of War into Risk Assessment:
Benefits.—Requiring commanders to evaluate the risk of war
crimes (i.e., adopting a negligence standard) is not necessarily a bad result.
It provides incentives for all commanders to actually study the list of
applicable war crimes and understand the elements of each. This is
important because current lower-level commanders tend to lack a working
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See Damaska, supra note 70, at 480–81.
See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 281 (suggesting due process concerns would undermine the
legitimacy of a conviction based on strict liability principles given the severity of the punishment).
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See MELONI, supra note 14, at 188–89.
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See id.
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See id. at 189 (“[W]hat triggers the superior’s duty to act is the knowledge . . . of the risk of
commission of crimes by subordinates.” (alteration in original)).
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Hansen, supra note 19, at 273 app.
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Rome Statute, supra note 52.
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knowledge of many important aspects of the law of land warfare.236
Instead, these leaders frequently understand only a few important law-ofwar issues—namely, those that are listed in the theater’s rules of
engagement. 237 The provision would incentivize small-unit commanders to
understand the complete list of applicable crimes.
Turning law-of-war violation prevention into an exercise in risk
assessment is also beneficial because commanders are already familiar with
the concept. 238 A commander is required to conduct risk assessment prior to
any mission or training event. 239 This exercise asks him to consider all
conceivable hazards his soldiers may face during a mission and plan ahead
in an attempt to mitigate these dangers. 240 For example, prior to Lieutenant
Ligsay’s visit to the village La Mohammad Kalay, he would have been
required to assess such risks as the potential for ambush along the route,
weather effects on his soldiers, or a possible communications breakdown
during the mission. A negligence standard seeks to add an additional
consideration to the matrix by asking commanders to assess the potential
that their soldiers will inflict criminal injury on others. To be sure, Army
doctrine already requires a commander to consider the effects of his
mission on the civilian population (i.e., noncombatants).241 But this form of
command responsibility would highlight war crimes for special
consideration.
2.

Transforming Law of War into Risk Assessment:
Drawbacks.—Despite the benefits of including potential law-ofwar violations in small-unit commanders’ routine risk assessment
procedures, a problem occurs when a commander actually works through
the analysis. Normally when a commander encounters a risk he must
answer two questions: (1) How likely is the risk’s occurrence?; and (2)
What are the adverse effects of the risk? 242 The latter inquiry is relatively
236

Although all military personnel are required to receive training on the laws of war, the subject is
generally taught to junior leaders only during entry-level training schools and other intermittent
leadership courses. See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, LAW OF WAR TRAINING:
RESOURCES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS 29 (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/
publications/law-of-war-training-resources-military-and-civilian-leaders.
237
Every soldier is required to know the rules of engagement in effect in his area of operation (e.g.,
Afghanistan or Iraq) and keep a copy with him while deployed. See FM 7-21.13, supra note 136, paras.
5-117 to -118.
238
See generally U.S DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 5-19, COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT (21
Aug. 2006) [hereinafter FM 5-19] (discussing the application of composite risk management to the
military decision-making process).
239
Id. para. 1-0 (Composite Risk Management “is a continuous process applied across the full
spectrum of Army training and operations . . . .”).
240
See id. paras. 1-2 to -44 (describing the five-step Composite Risk Management process).
241
See id. paras. 1-17 to -18 (discussing how civilian considerations are part of the standard format
for identifying mission hazards).
242
See id. paras. 1-22 (laying out the “three substeps” of Composite Risk Management).
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straightforward—war crimes have a devastating effect on the local
population and hinder a unit’s ability to operate within that local area.
Instead, the real challenge is in assessing the likelihood that a war crime
will occur.
Assessing the likelihood of a war crime is problematic for two reasons.
First, there is little consensus on what factors to consider when evaluating
the risk of a subordinate committing a war crime. Second, even if there
were, there is little agreement as to when a risk becomes so great that it
demands action from the commander. In light of these pitfalls, it is
counterproductive to hold small-unit commanders responsible on the basis
of negligence unless they have strong incentives to shun their law-of-war
duties.
The first problem with using risk assessment in the context of war
crimes is that there is little agreement as to what factors should be used
when weighing the degree of risk. The Rome Statute asks what a
commander should have known “owing to the circumstances at the
time.” 243 Although Hansen’s proposal does not use this language, it uses a
reasonably prudent commander standard to assess negligence.244 Under this
approach, prudence depends on the circumstances at hand as well.
But the question becomes: Which circumstances are relevant when
considering the risk of war crimes? Certainly intelligence about a potential
crime is relevant, 245 even if it is just rumors. If Lieutenant Ligsay had
received a report or overheard rumblings that his subordinates were
planning to stage a killing, that should have factored into his assessment.
Yet there are a number of other factors Lieutenant Ligsay could have also
considered, such as: his soldiers’ level of training, particularly with respect
to the laws of war; their attitude toward noncombatants; their personal
issues, past misconduct, and general compliance with basic standards of
discipline; and his unit’s reputation. 246 Furthermore, in light of the Staff
Sergeant Bales massacre, one might also include a subordinate’s mental
health on this list. 247 Each of these is a plausible indicator that a subordinate
is likely to commit a war crime in the future. There has been little effort,
however, to determine which of these factors commanders should be
required to assess. 248
243

See Rome Statute, supra note 52 (emphasis added); see also MELONI, supra note 14, at 185.
See Hansen, supra note 19, at 273 app.
245
MELONI, supra note 14, at 185.
246
These are drawn from the facts as outlined in Part II.A.1.
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See supra Part II.A.2.
248
Hansen offers an opinion on what should constitute a relevant circumstance:
[T]he level of training and experience of the forces under his command; the severity and duration
of past combat operations that involved his forces; the nature of the mission; the availability of
other forces who may be at a higher state of readiness and competence; the existence of specific
orders from a higher authority; and the overall morale of the forces under his command.
Hansen, supra note 25, at 408. However, there is no consensus on the issue.
244

1419

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Even if there is agreement on what constitutes a relevant warning sign,
commanders may not be particularly adept at judging how particular
circumstances fit together. They may not be able to accurately assess a
mixture of positive and negative indicators. Consider the perspective of the
following commander. He knows that his subordinate, Private Snuffy,
refers to local Afghans as “savages” and is having problems with his family
back home. At the same time, Private Snuffy is a professional soldier who
knows his rules of engagement and has never acted out while on mission.
How could the commander know whether Private Snuffy is likely to
commit a war crime? As this simple example illustrates, a commander is
forced to make an assessment he may be ill equipped to handle.249
The second major problem with utilizing risk assessment is that
commanders do not have notice as to what degree of risk triggers the
potential for liability. When assessing the likelihood of a hazard,
commanders normally classify risks as either low, medium, high, or
extremely high. 250 Commentators have given little consideration, however,
to where the line should be drawn for establishing liability. Does a
commander have to identify a low, medium, high, or extremely high risk of
a war crime before his failure to take reasonable preventative measures
gives rise to criminal liability? There is always some level of risk that war
crimes are about to be committed, even after a commander takes steps to
mitigate them. 251 The problem lies in identifying what constitutes an
acceptable level of risk. Because it is difficult to distinguish between an
acceptable and substantial level of risk in the midst of war, commanders
should be afforded the benefit of a more lenient mental standard.
*

*

*

In light of these considerations, adopting a negligent failure to prevent
form of command responsibility is counterproductive. It is ultimately too
difficult for commanders to assess the likelihood of a crime and the degree
of risk that a crime will occur. It is inadvisable to allow command
responsibility to turn on such uncertain determinations. The main benefit of
a negligence regime is that it incentivizes commanders to expand their
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Simply holding Private Snuffy back from a mission is not likely the easy solution to this
problem. Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan routinely faced issues regarding depleted manpower.
See, e.g., Josh White, A Shortage of Troops in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, July 3, 2008, at A1, available
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knowledge on the laws of war. That benefit, which can be achieved through
other means, does not outweigh its costs to small-unit commanders.
B. Negligent Failures to Punish War Crimes
The failure to punish form of command responsibility provides a
different set of incentives for commanders. Whereas the preventative prong
is about risk assessment and identifying warning signs, the punishment
prong is meant to create incentives for commanders to investigative
incidents and prevent cover-ups. 252 The inquiry into a commander’s failure
to punish usually revolves around what reporting systems he had in place
and how closely he looked into the matter.253
Although punishing negligent failures to prevent is counterproductive,
holding commanders liable for negligent failures to punish may be still
appropriate. The difference lies in the preexisting incentives that are
created by COIN warfare. Whereas commanders already have ample
incentives to prevent crimes in order to avoid public backlash, there are
negative incentives for commanders to report crimes once they occur.254
For example, if a commander can keep an incident discreet, he can avoid a
potentially deadly outcry against his unit. 255 Because of the pressure to keep
quiet, any command responsibility regime should provide maximum
incentives for both small-unit and higher-level leaders to hold their
subordinates responsible for violations of the laws of war. Thus, adopting a
standard of negligence is more appropriate for failures to punish than for
preventative failures.
CONCLUSION
Although the U.S. military has recognized the concept of command
responsibility for over sixty years, it remains a dormant criminal doctrine.
The U.S. military instead relies mostly on administrative and nonjudicial
means to punish leaders who fail to ensure that their soldiers comply with
the laws of war. Many commentators assert that stronger incentives are
needed to prevent future war crimes. But as scholars seek to create stronger
measures and codify command responsibility, they must keep small-unit
commanders in mind. Lower-level leaders are not only the best resource for
preventing and reporting war crimes; they are the keys to success in COIN
operations. Any codified form of command responsibility must strike a
delicate balance to ensure that small-unit commanders focus on law-of-war
compliance while still operating freely.
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The increasing importance of small-unit leaders makes clear that some
basic notions of command responsibility need to be rethought before
formalizing the doctrine in domestic law. As the focus on small-unit
leaders demonstrates, a negligence standard does not always lead to
optimal solutions, despite its widespread support. Perhaps, if the time
comes, a small-unit leader approach will provide a framework that will
help jurists and military leaders agree on how best to draft a widely
accepted U.S. provision.
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